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In Money and Justice." Who Owns the Courts?, Judge Lois Forer
makes several perceptive and timely observations on the current state
of the law. "The price of justice and who shall pay it are leitmotifs of
this book."' She offers insight gained from her varied career as a
litigator, adjunct law professor, and most recently, as a Pennsylvania
trial court judge in both criminal and civil matters. As a judge on
the "front lines" of the justice system, Judge Forer offers several challenges to the legal profession and to contemporary society. This is
not yet another scathing indictment of law and lawyers. Instead, it is
a rare and refreshing exception to the wholesale, nihilistic criticisms
that are currently in vogue. While the questions of unequal justice is
a timeworn theme, she examines it from some novel angles. Despite
the grave imbalance in the quality of justice attributable to socioeconomic class, Judge Forer remains convinced that the United States
legal system provides more justice than that of any other nation. The
task is to translate the fundamental guarantees of equal protection
and due process from platitudes into realities, regardless of individual
economic means. She avoids the pedantic, turgid style of conventional legal scholarship and instead writes in a crisp, straightforward
style. Her analyses are enlivened through several vivid case studies.
Judge Forer maintains that the courts are dominated by the interests of the wealthy, while the poor and middle classes are relegated
to a second class, perverted "turnstile" justice. This is the central
thesis and the core problem posed in the book. According to Judge
Forer, "despite lip service to the doctrine of equal protection of the
laws, the courts have in effect put a price tag on justice."2 Although
the current bifurcated situation is not the product of conscious malevolent design, it is imperative that the problem be consciously
rectified.
The United States has always been a consumer society, and that
mentality has permeated the legal system. The pernicious but
wholly predictable result has yielded justice based on ability to pay.
For example, last year over one hundred thousand persons were confined simply because they were unable to make bail. Justice has
never been free, and attorney fees are usually the single largest comI
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ponent of the legal cost equation. The essential objective is to mitigate the economic considerations so often determinative of the
quality of justice that is available. Rule of law depends on equal
protection for all persons regardless of the individual's ability to pay.
Faith in law has been betrayed by ability to buy justice, and the ideal
of law has thus been reduced to a hollow platitude. Leading corporate law firms devote the vast bulk of their time to a tiny percentage
of the population, serving major corporations and a handful of very
wealthy individuals in complex civil law matters. Apart from some
pro bono activity, criminal law practice is virtually unknown to these
elite firms. The indigent, the working poor, and even the middle
classes are consigned to burdened public defenders and sole practitioners usually unable to concentrate attention or resources on behalf
of any single client. As a result, meaningful due process is not afforded to those consigned to assembly line justice.
Examples of the disparate legal treatment accorded the less influential abound. Most poor criminal defendants never have a trial.
Unable to afford expensive private legal talent and pressured by beleaguered public defenders, they plead guilty en masse. Unable to
fund the often prohibitive costs of effective preparation in civil litigation, those less wealthy often settle claims prematurely or entirely
forego valid actions. Corporate antitrust litigation can span nearly
two decades, involve hundreds of attorneys, and cost the taxpayers
millions. Meanwhile, thousands of cases could have been heard.
John Hinckley, after a seven week trial replete with testimony from
batteries of expensive expert witnesses, was found not guilty by reason of insanity for his assassination attempt on President Reagan.
On the other hand, average trial time in civil and criminal matters is
less than two hours; the average family court judge hears thirty-five
juvenile cases per day.
The solution is not to deprive corporations and wealthy individuals of their due process rights. Rather, the mandate is to afford at
least minimal justice for the great bulk of those litigants not economically well-positioned. All litigants are not entitled to months of trial
at taxpayers' expense, and not every criminal defendant deserves the
services of an F. Lee Bailey. One suggested improvement may be to
require wealthy litigants to pay for the public resources utilized by
their protracted litigation, thereby freeing the indigent of seemingly
nominal, but nonetheless often prohibitive, filing fees. While justice
cannot be measured via a time clock, it certainly must no longer be
rationed out primarily by ability to pay. Adequate due process protections transcend time constraints.
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In a fallible legal system, there can be no failsafe guarantees of
justice in every case. However, as Judge Forer reminds us, "[w]hat
can be ensured is that every party with a claim or defense receives an
adequate due-process hearing in a court of law."' While the lack of a
fair hearing can compromise a civil litigant, it can condemn a criminal defendant to death. Bifurcated justice cannot be simplistically
attributed to the purported explosion in the volume of cases filed and
appeals brought in the state and Federal courts. While an increase in
the number of cases was recorded throughout the past decade, recent
projections strongly suggest that the volume of civil cases is beginning to level off. The number of new filings will decline significantly
for the foreseeable future. Concomitantly, demographics and FBI reports indicate that crime is also declining. Thus, the largely uncritical and indiscriminate rush to alternative despute resolution (ADR)
is unwarranted. Refinement of conventional litigation processes,
rather than their abandonment in search of a quick fix, is the optimal
means of furthering justice.
Perhaps the most valuable portion of the book is Judge Forer's
forceful contention that ADR may often be counterproductive to justice. Judge Forer thus joins a few other cautionary voices in opposition to the otherwise near universal call for ADR, echoed most
prominently by Chief Justice Burger. Indiscriminate utilization of
ADR may insidiously consign the lower economic classes to short circuited due process, while preserving formal litigation channels, with
the full panoply of due process protections, for the wealthy. Claims
only recently brought with any measurable effectiveness on behalf of
the historically disadvantaged can be fully asserted only in litigation.
Relegating to ADR matters of race and sex discrimination, personal
injury and disability claims, and juvenile and prisoner rights may
cripple the rights of those economically less privileged. Values of formal litigation are manifold; their attendant costs are the price required for furnishing meaningful due process and protection of the
law.
The purpose of Judge Forer's commentary, however, is not to
condemn ADR. Rather, she urges that the potential disadvantages
of ADR be carefully examined prior to its sweeping implementation.
She states that "in the interests of speed and economy, [the ADR
advocates] would sacrifice procedural regularity and due process of
law. A few warning voices have been raised. But catchpenny panaceas have taken the public fancy."4 As Judge Forer perceptively
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summarizes, "dispute-resolution mechanisms are simply a means of
resolving private disputes outside the protections and safeguards of
the legal system. . . . [T]he cost of courts is what Americans pay for
a free and lawful society." 5 Channeling disputes en masse into ADR
modes will not eliminate the disputes themselves. Because only a
small fraction of cases ever proceed to trial, it is clear that ADR already occurs, informally but effectively, in the vast majority of cases.
Widespread use of ADR in lieu of litigation may be overkill, and the
primary sacrifice would be the rights of the poor. As Judge Forer
maintains,
the thrust of the popular panaceas is to deny access to the courts
for a wide variety of problems. Under the proposals the bulk of
the cases that would be diverted from the courts involve poor people . . . . [11n operation they would institutionalize two separate
and unequal systems of justice: courts of law with rights and constitutional6 safeguards for the rich and speedy extralegal forms for
the poor.
ADR has its place in the legal system, but ultimately cannot be substituted for the courts.
While criticizing fellow judges and lawyers, Judge Forer refrains
from the indiscriminate excoriation of the profession so egregiously popularized by Chief Justice Burger. Rather than indulge in the same sort
of tiresome and perverse professional self-hate, Judge Forer provides several positive recommendations for improving the quality of the bench
and the bar.
Unfortunately, she occasionally does not adequately explain or reconcile some of the tensions in her recommendations. While she chides
law students for avoiding courses in legal history and jurisprudence,
which are at the very heart of the legal tradition, she also faults the law
schools for failing to teach adequate trial skills. Implementation of both
recommendations would either result in a six-year curriculum or deprive
students of electives. If her suggestion of a bar exam prerequisite consisting of preparation for and participation in trials is added, the study
of law would span nearly a decade. Judge Forer accuses law school faculties of homogeneity and artificial distance from practitioners. Typically, after graduating from prestigious law schools and completing
Federal clerkships, many young lawyers are recruited directly into the
ranks of law faculties without any practice and perhaps even without
having taken a bar exam. This is an obvious problem. However, senior
partners in prominent law firms are not queing to apply for law faculty
5 Id. at 43.
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positions paying less ihan one-tenth of what they earn in practice. Because competent, established practitioners rarely want to make the compensation sacrifice to teach, law schools choose to respond to affirmative
action concerns by quickly hiring their best minority and female graduates soon after graduation. In this respect, the present system has definite virtues. Judge Forer fails to suggest how law schools can
realistically attract established practitioners and also satisfy affirmative
action considerations from a small pool of senior minority and female
attorneys.
Judge Forer's law school curriculum and faculty reforms, however,
are the only attenuated recommendations in the book. She also suggests
that legal research is not sufficiently empirical, and she advances some
proposals to integrate more economics, and social and behavioral sciences into computer-based legal studies. She perceptively predicts that
narrow doctrinal research will become increasingly inane and dysfunctional unless and until academics acquire facility with empirical methods of contemporary scientific research modes.
Despite the many blatant case examples of professional incompetence and corruption examined in the book, she maintains that most
lawyers and judges are conscientious and concerned. If her suggestions
are to be implemented, these members of the bar will be the audience to
act upon her recommendations. Without the effective support of the
bar, it is impossible to see legislatures unilaterally allocating desparately
needed resources to improve the quality of justice now so infrequently
afforded to the less privileged classes.
Last year, Judge Forer notes, the cost of maintaining the entire
Federal judiciary was less than one-tenth the cost of building 1,000 small
missiles. This pointedly highlights the nature of the problem. Judges,
especially those presiding in the state courts, labor in often appalling
conditions, lacking even minimal support staff, and buried under impossible case loads. This lack of resources for judicial administration partially accounts for the warped assembly line justice accorded to the nonelite. Judge Forer deplores the often conscious and widespread judicial
abdication of core responsibility to law clerks, which occurs at every
level of the judiciary. Likewise, she assails the processes of judicial appointment often contingent on political connections and cronyism
rather than on intellecutal merit and ability. Some of her recommendations for reform are exaggerated. She advocates a minimum requirement of fifteen years of active litigation experience for any judicial
appointment. However, under this criterion, William 0. Douglas and
Felix Frankfurter would have been kept from the bench.
For the most part, Judge Forer avoids falling into a mechanical
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litany and instead offers more useful general benchmarks to foster judicial competence. She castigates the ominous recent developments in
some Federal courts of appeals not to publish opinions. Two-thirds of
the decisions of the prestigious Second Circuit are not published. Over
half of all state and Federal appellate decisions are not reported for publication. If this practice is not halted, the value of precedent will be
utterly compromised. The ultimate result of this atomized, ad hoc justice will be a legal Tower of Babel. Responsible appellate decisions historically have clarified and shaped the evolution of law. To abandon
this rich history in favor of the seduction of simplistic expedition is a
grave mistake. Instead, she forcefully argues that the appellate process
should be strengthened and refined.
Particular attention is focused on family courts, reflecting Judge
Forer's own experience as a judge in juvenile and domestic matters. It is
here that the lack of resources and the press of cases is most severe. Consequently, juveniles are the most victimized by routine deprivations of
due process in the form of fair hearings. The average juvenile hearing is
concluded in a matter of minutes. Incarceration for years despite the
absence of any proof of crime is an all too common occurrence. Yet,
since juveniles and prisoners are politically powerless, lacking the resources of organized lobbies to crusade for reform, it is not surprising
that these travesties of justice continue. Again, Judge Forer posits that
they are largely reducible to economic considerations. Although perhaps no court has more important responsibilities than the juvenile
courts, the best attorneys and judges usually do not practice there.
There is very little money to be earned in the representation of children
from poor families. Further, the historic social subordination of children
largely deprives even altruistic lawyers of the prestige and gratification
of performing indispensable work.
The goal is to provide justice to all, with the costs of the legal system borne equitably. Rather than reduce the rights accorded to the
wealthy, the objective is to translate the promise and ideal of justice into
reality for all of society. Individual litigants are entitled to sufficient
court time to obtain a fair hearing; assembly line processing must stop.
Legal education must be continually revised to ensure professional competence of both bench and bar. The appellate process must also be
strengthened to afford protections and to elucidate the law. Courts
should have the benefit of more empirical legal research. There are no
solutions that will easily and definitively provide equal justice regardless
of economic position. Realistically, the problems of unequal justice are
likely to plague society and the legal profession for the foreseeable future. Indeed, some of Judge Forer's suggestions, while thoughtfully
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presented, seem to defy realistic implementation. Fortunately, on balance, she provides more than a simplistic litany that reiterates shopworn
themes. Her unique perspective as practitioner, professor, and judge
provides positive and refreshing new insights on the old problems of affording equal justice. She has fulfilled the timeless role of Socratic gadfly on the legal conscience. The book merits the serious attention of the
entire legal profession. One hopes that some of the recommendations
inspire positive action.
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